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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
OF TITLE VII OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964-
A TEN-YEAR PERSPECTIVE
THOMAS R. EWALD*
Discrimination in employment subjects female and minority group
workers to heavy losses in earnings, in training for advancement and
job security, and in human dignity. Inequality of employment oppor-
tunity has been recognized as a fundamental source of public prob-
lems, especially in urban areas.1 In Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,2 Congress enacted comprehensive legislation prohibiting a
full range of discriminatory employment practices based on race,
color, religion, sex and national origin, and providing enforcement
roles for both federal agencies and private parties. The Act is esti-
mated to cover approximately 63,000,000 employees, of whom approx-
imately 49,000,000 are employed by private employers and 14,000,000
are employed by state and local governments and by educational in-
* Attorney-at-Law, Washington, D.C.; Section Chief, Civil Rights Division,
Department of Justice, 1966-71; B.A., Harvard University, 1951; J.D., University
of Chicago, 1957.
The author is grateful to the several officials within the Department of Justice
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission whose interviews and docu-
ments supplied much of the information for this article.
I. See, e.g., RPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY ComiKsssIoN ON CsVnL Dis-
ORDERS 124 (1968).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1970).
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stitutions. Approximately 559,000 private employers and 71,000 labor
organizations are covered.3
The purpose of this article is to describe the enforcement provisions
of the Act and to outline the litigative activities by government agen-
cies and private parties in the three types of cases that have character-
ized court action under Title VII during the ten-year period since the
Act's adoption. The record of enforcement compels the conclusion
that effective enforcement of the Act has barely commenced. A much
larger volume of litigation probably will be filed before the country
approaches widespread compliance with the law against discrimina-
tion in employment.
I. TITLE VII ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
A. Preliminary: Individual vs. System Discrimination
At the outset a distinction should be recognized between two types
of cases-those involving discriminatory treatment of an individual
employee or job applicant and those involving discrimination against
many workers arising out of the regular operations of an employment
system. The following case is an example of claimed discriminatory
treatment of an individual black worker. A black mechanic was dis-
charged from his job during a general reduction in the company's
work force. The worker protested that his discharge and the employ-
er's general hiring practices were racially motivated. He demonstrated
his protest by illegally stalling his car so as to block the main access
road to the plant during the rush hour. Thereafter, the company
advertised that mechanic jobs were available, and the worker applied.
The company rejected his application, basing its rejection on the
worker's participation in the traffic stall-in. The worker filed suit
claiming that defendant's refusal to rehire him was racially discrim-
inatory, in violation of Section 703 (a) (1) of the Act, and was re-
taliatory, in violation of Section 704 (a) .4
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Estimated Coverage
of Employers and Employees under Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, and as
Amended by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (unpublished) (1973).
4. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). The district
court dismissed the Title VII claim because the EEOC had failed to make a de-
termination of reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Title VII had been
committed. 299 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mo. 1969). On appeal after a trial of the
remaining issues, the Supreme Court held that a private suit may be filed by an
aggrieved party who has filed a timely charge with the EEOC and has received
from the Commission a statutory notice of right to sue, even though the Coin-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol7/iss1/5
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The following case is an example of discrimination against black
workers resulting from the regular operations of an employment sys-
tem. A tobacco company formerly maintained racially segregated
departments in its tobacco processing plant by hiring and assigning
only white employees to the departments where jobs paid higher
wages and offered more training for advancement, and by hiring and
assigning black employees to only those departments where jobs paid
less and offered fewer promotional opportunities. Prior to the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the company and the union represent-
ing production employees agreed to abandon the segregated system
and to allow incumbent black employees to transfer into traditionally
white departments. On transferring, however, black employees were
required to start at the entry level job, usually at less pay than they
had been earning in their former, traditionally black department.
Promotions within each department were awarded on the basis of
departmental seniority, and black employees who transferred into
traditionally white departments received no seniority credit for the
time they had worked in traditionally black departments under the
segregated system. After the passage of Title VII, the company pro-
posed a change in the collective bargaining agreement to replace
departmental seniority with plant-wide seniority, but the union re-
fused. Black employees filed a class action suit against both the com-
pany and union on behalf of all incumbent black employees in the
plant who were hired into traditionally black departments under the
segregated system.5!
As illustrated by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,6 cases in-
volving discriminatory treatment of an individual worker present
complaints that are either unique to one individual or shared by only
mission has not made a finding of reasonable cause. The Court articulated the
"order and allocation of proof in a private, single-plaintiff action challenging
employment discrimination" (93 S. Ct. at 1823) and remanded the case to the
district court for retrial according to those standards.
5. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp. 834 (M.D.N.C. 1970). The
district court held that the departmental seniority system perpetuated the dis-
criminatory effects of the past segregation, in violation of Section 703(a),(c) of
the Act, and that the system was not justified by business necessity. The court
ordered defendants to institute a plant-wide seniority system and to adopt a rate
retention procedure for employees transferring into new departments. The award
included back pay to the members of the class and costs to the representative
plaintiffs.
6. See note 4 supra.
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
a few workers. They arise out of unusual incidents or isolated cases,
in which a particular foreman, manager, or official is said to have
acted in a discriminatory manner, often because of discriminatory
motives. At the trial, the credibility of witnesses probably will be
decisive of the liability issue.
By contrast, cases involving discrimination arising out of the regular
operations of an employment system, as illustrated by Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp. challenge employment practices that are routinely
followed throughout a plant, a company, a trade, or an industry.
Where discrimination is present, such practices have an impact on
the employment opportunities of all female workers or all minority
workers whom the system affects and tend to put all of them at a
disadvantage in a similar way. In cases of this sort, the administrators
who set up and operate the employment system usually do not have
conscious discriminatory motives. At the trial of a case that challenges
the discriminatory aspects of a defendant's normal business practices,
the pattern of discrimination often can be shown as readily through
the company's own business records as through the testimony of wit-
nesses, and the credibility of witnesses is less likely to be decisive.
The Supreme Court held in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.s that un-
lawful discrimination includes regular business practices that are
"neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent," which
"operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory practices."0
Experience since the passage of Title VII has shown that the latter
type of discrimination, consisting of business practices engaged in by
administrators who feel no ill will toward anyone, causes most
workers to sustain the heaviest losses. Such practices have been found
in firms' basic systems of employment, including recruiting and hir-
ing;10 job assignment, promotion, and transfer;"- pay and benefits;12
7. See note 5 supra.
8. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MrcH. L. Rnv. 59
(1972).
9. 401 U.S. at 430.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir.
1973); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971).
11. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Jones v. Lee
Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
954 (1971); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969);
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Va. 1967).
12. See, e.g., Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973).
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layoff and recall;' 3 and discharge, retirement, or other termination."
The discrimination often arises out of a seniority system or the use
of aptitude tests. Routine practices having discriminatory effects des-
pite a neutral appearance also have been found in trade unions'
operations with regard to membership, training, and job assignment
from referral halls, and in the operations of employment agencies.
B. Development of the Act's Enforcement Provisions
The foregoing distinction between discrimination in the treatment
of an individual and discrimination in the regular operations of an
employment system played an important part in the history of the
adoption of Title VII and its amendment in 1972. As originally
passed in 1964, the Act reflected a popular thought of the day that
discrimination in employment consisted mainly of instances of dis-
criminatory treatment of individuals, and that once discrimination
was prohibited by law, voluntary compliance by employers, labor
organizations, and employment agencies would follow, helped where
necessary by informal conciliation and persuasion on the part of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). It was
thought that a federal agency with compulsory enforcement powers
would be needed in only a few, rare instances where recalcitrant and
persistent violations were encountered.'1 Accordingly, the enforcement
sections of Title VII omitted any authority for the EEOC to initiate
enforcement,"- gave the Department of Justice the power to file
suits in "pattern or practice" cases,'1 and allowed private parties to
file suits where they felt themselves aggrieved after the Act's ad-
ministrative procedures had failed.-i
Experience under the Act soon demonstrated that employment dis-
13. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 118-19 (5th
Cir. 1972); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
14. See, e.g., Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R.R., - F.2d -, 5 F.E.P. Cases
853 (5th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D.
Cal. 1971).
15. STA F Or SENATE COMM. oN LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CoNG., 2D
Ses,., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF
1972, at 1586 (Comm. Print 1972).
16. The Act gave the Commission power to commence proceedings to enforce
court orders, which it exercised sparingly. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(i) (1970).
17. Id. § 2000e-6(a).
18. Originally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970) (now 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)
(Supp. I 1972)).
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crimination was more widespread than most legislators had recog-
nized and that the most serious discrimination occurred through the
regular operations of employment systems, not through unfair treat-
ment of individuals, as legislators had supposed. In its first five years
of operation, the EEOC received more than 52,000 charges of dis-
crimination. The Commission found reasonable cause to believe that
the charges were true in more than 22,000 cases but was unable to
conciliate even half of them. 19
Voluntary compliance was not forthcoming because discrimination
of the type that arises out of regular business operations is resistant to
voluntary reform by the administrators of the system. There are
several reasons for this resistance. First, workers subject to a routine
business practice that has discriminatory aspects may not complain,
either because they have become accustomed to the practice, because
they do not recognize that it is discriminatory, because they do not
realize that it infringes on their rights, or because they expect retalia-
tion. Secondly, the employer, union official, or employment agency
manager who administers the employment system in question also
may have become accustomed to the practice, may not recognize that
it is discriminatory against female or minority workers, or may not
realize that it is unlawful. In the absence of complaints, it may not oc-
cur to this administrator that his regular business operations need to be
examined to determine whether they comply with the law. Thirdly,
even if complaints of discrimination are made, the administrator of the
employment system may resist the changes necessary to eliminate the
discrimination because the existing system is more familiar, more
convenient, and more economical to operate than the remedial sys-
tem would be. Fourthly, an employer or union official may resist
changes in response to resistance he feels from the workers who are
favored by the present system and, in the case of employers, from
their union. Lastly, the administrator may resist changes to remove
discrimination from an employment system because he does not ex-
pect the law to be enforced against him.
The failure of voluntary compliance and a widespread agreement
that a more effective federal enforcement effort was necessary led to
the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
amending Section 706 of Title VII to give the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission the power to file civil actions in cases where
19. STAFF OF SENATE Copie., supra note 15, at 63-64.
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the EEOC has been unable to secure an acceptable conciliation
agreement. -i The amendments also extended the coverage of Title
VII to state and local governments and authorized the Department of
Justice to file suits against them. 21 Section 707, as amended, provided
that the Attorney General's "pattern or practice" authority will shift
to the EEOC in March of 1974 unless the President and Congress
direct otherwise.22 The Senate-House Conference Committee rejected
a provision in the House bill which would have prevented private
parties from filing class action suits under the Act.23
II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
ON THREE LEVELS OF LITIGATION
Title VII litigation can be regarded as proceeding on three levels,
with the relationship between private and public enforcement activity
varying from one level to the next. The three levels, divided accord-
ing to the number of workers for whom relief is directly sought and
the number of different employment systems that are involved, are as
follows: (1) "individual" cases brought on behalf of one or a few in-
dividual workers, (2) "plant-wide" cases challenging discrimination
in the employment practices of a single administrative system, and
(3) "company" cases challenging discrimination in the employment
practices of two or more administrative systems.
The names "individual," "plant-wide," and "company" are in-
tended to be suggestive and not exactly descriptive of the three cate-
gories. "Individual" cases may be brought on behalf of one or a few
workers to remedy either discrimination in individual treatment or
discrimination arising out of the operations of a system of employ-
ment. The category of "plant-wide" cases includes suits against an
employer to remedy discrimination at a single plant, suits against
a local union that operates a single referral hall, and suits against an
employment agency to seek relief from discriminatory practices at one
office. "Company" cases include cases against an employer to remedy
discrimination at all or most of its plants, cases against a labor or-
ganization to remedy discrimination by the national organization or
by several of the union's locals, and cases against an employment
agency to remedy discrimination at all or most of its offices.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. II 1972).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 2000e-6(c).
23. STAFF OF SENATE COMm., supra note 15, at 1847.
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
Practically all individual cases have been filed by private attorneys,
partly because the EEOC began its history without enforcement au-
thority and the authority of the Department of Justice was limited to
"pattern or practice" cases, suggesting cases involving a large number
of workers. Plant-wide cases have been filed by both private attorneys
and government agencies in roughly equal numbers. Practically all
company cases have been filed by government agencies because the
financial and manpower requirements of litigation against several
employment systems in the same lawsuit put those cases beyond the
reach of most private counsel.
Most suits filed under Title VII have been individual cases. Plant-
wide and company cases, however, have provided relief for more
workers, and the number of such cases brought by the government
has doubled in the year and a half since EEOC obtained the power
to commence litigation.
A. Level One: Individual Cases
Most suits filed under Title VII have been brought by one indi-
vidual or a few workers on their own behalf without claiming to
represent anyone else. In such cases a favorable court order benefits
only the named plaintiffs directly.
An individual case may challenge discrimination in individual treat-
ment, as in the Green case.24 Or an individual case may seek relief
for one worker from discrimination arising out of the regular opera-
tion of an employment system, as in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co.25 In Weeks, a female employee won the right
to be considered for craft jobs, which the company had restricted to
male employees only. Plaintiff obtained a decision that established
the principle that the "bona fide occupational qualification" excep-
tion of Section 703 (e) of the Act is to be interpreted narrowly.26 The
decision of the Weeks case became a landmark in the law of sex dis-
crimination. It also helped lay the foundation for a nationwide settle-
ment between three federal agencies and American Telephone &
Telegraph Company and its 22 operating subsidiary companies for the
benefit of thousands of workers.27
24. See note 4 supra.
25. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
26. Id. at 235.
27. See note 43 infra. In other Title VII cases brought by individuals, the
Supreme Court held in a per curiam decision that § 703 (a) of the Civil Rights
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No individual cases have been filed by the EEOC or the Depart-
ment of Justice because the authority of the Department of Justice
is limited to "pattern or practice" cases and because both agencies
have attempted to use their limited resources to obtain relief for
the largest number of workers in each case. Instead, they have entered
privately-filed, individual cases selectively, either by filing briefs as
amicus curiae or by intervening to expand the cases' scope.
During the period from 1965 to 1972, when it had no enforcement
authority, the EEOC appeared as amicus in more than 500 cases,
including Weeks, Robinson, and Love v. Pullman Co. 28 The Depart-
ment of Justice has appeared as amicus in 14 cases. Both agencies
appeared as amicus in Green and Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.29
When a federal agency having litigation authority intervenes in
an action commenced by an individual, as in Dobbins v. IBEW Local
212,30 the intervention invariably escalates the lawsuit from an in-
dividual case to a plant-wide case and increases the number of workers
directly affected. W,\rhen the Government intervenes it usually takes
the lead in preparation and trial of the case on behalf of the plain-
tiffs because it has the resources to do so.
B. Level Two: Plant-Wide Cases
An example of a plant-wide action challenging discrimination by
two local labor organizations is United States v. Sheet Metal Workers
Local 36.1 The Attorney General claimed that a local of the Sheet
Act of 1964 was violated when women with pre-school age children were not
hired, while men with pre-school age children were hired, unless there was a
legitimate business necessity for the distinction by the corporation. Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). In Love v. Pullman Co., 404
U.S. 522 (1972), in which plaintiff employee complained of racial discrimina-
tion, the Court unanimously reversed a narrow reading of the requirements for
filing a complaint with the EEOC and state agencies.
28. See note 27 supra.
29. See note 27 supra.
30. 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). The Government often files a separate
parallel lawsuit rather than intervening directly in a private case. See, e.g.,
United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (now
pending in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit), where the United States
filed a separate suit in order to avoid the preliminary administrative issues raised
ir. a parallel private suit, Muldrow v. H. K. Porter Co., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir.
1969).
31. 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969). For a class action case see note 5 and
accompanying text supra.
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Metal Workers and a local of the Electrical Workers discriminated
against black workers in union membership, apprenticeship training,
and referral for jobs. The Eighth Circuit, reversing a district court
judgment against the Government,32 held that the Attorney General
was not required to prove that defendants had refused membership
or work referral to black workers after Title VII's effective date be-
cause defendants perpetuated the same discriminatory system that
existed before the Act and had failed to publicize any changes that
had been made to remove the discriminatory features of the system. 3
Plant-wide cases against employers, and similar cases against labor
organizations and employment agencies, are filed by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission as suits for enforcement, by the
Department of Justice as "pattern or practice" cases, and by private
parties as class actions. The conditions precedent to suit vary.
The Attorney General may file suit under Title VII "[w]henever
.. [he] has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of
persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full em-
ployment of any of the rights secured by .. .[Title VII], and that
the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny
the full exercise of [those] rights . . . ."34 There is no requirement
that the Attorney General must receive complaints of discrimination
or exhaust any administrative procedures before filing suit, and the
filing of the complaint constitutes conclusive evidence that he has
"reasonable cause" as required by the statute.35
A private party may commence an action under Title VII if he has
filed a written charge with the EEOC and has received from the Com-
mission a statutory notice of right to sue.30 He may maintain the suit
as a class action if the case satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is determined by court
order as soon as practicable after the commencement of the case.3 7
It has been held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
32. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 280 F. Supp. 719 (E.D.
Mo. 1968).
33. 416 F.2d at 127, 140.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970).
35. United States v. Iron Workers Local 1, 438 F.2d 679, 681 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971).
36. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1822 (1973); see note
4 supra.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1).
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mission is required to plead and prove as a condition of maintaining
a suit that it has exhausted the administrative procedures provided
in the Act by receiving a written charge, serving respondent with
notice of the charge, investigating the charge, determining that there
is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, and attempting
to conciliate the case.--
A plant-wide case may seek relief for a class consisting of a definite
number of readily identifiable workers (for example, all female em-
ployees at the plant), or the case may seek relief for a class whose
members cannot be counted or identified (for example, all prospec-
tive applicants for jobs through the hiring hall).
The remedies available under the Act in plant-wide cases are the
same whether the cases are filed by the Justice Department, the EEOC,
or private plaintiffs, except that private plaintiffs who prevail also
may recover reasonable attorneys' fees.3
Government litigation in plant-wide cases, in addition to filing
lawsuits directly, has included interviewing and filing briefs as amicus
curiae in private individual cases and class action lawsuits. The 1972
amendments to Title VII for the first time allow private parties to
intervene in government litigation and also give the federal agencies a
reciprocal right to intervene in suits filed by private plaintiffs.4
0
C. Level Three: Company Cases
The few cases that have been filed challenging discrimination in a
variety of employment practices at all or most of a large company's
plant locations have been brought by government agencies. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Cannon Mills, Inc.,,4 the Department of Jus-
tice filed suit against a textile manufacturer with 14 plants and
23,000 employees in North and South Carolina. Private parties who
have filed cases covering all of a company's plants have confined them
to narrow issues that do not require extensive proof, as in Gilbert v.
38. See, e.g., EEOC v. Container Corp. of America, 352 F. Supp. 262, 265
(M.D. Fla. 1972).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. 11 1972).
41. Civil No. C-65-S-69 (M.D.N.C., consent decree entered Feb. 24, 1971).
See also United States v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., Civil No. 68-391
(S.D. Ohio, consent order entered Nov. 29, 1971) (statewide action against a
state employment agency).
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General Electric Co.,42 where the only form of discrimination in issue
was the company's refusal to pay female employees disability benefits
for pregnancy and childbirth.
The largest and most widely reported Title VII case to date, EEOC
v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&'T) ,3 involved all 22
operating subsidiaries of AT&T, each of which maintains its own
separate employment system. Company-wide litigation between gov-
ernment agencies and AT&T commenced when EEOC intervened in
a proceeding before the Federal Communications Commission in
which the company was requesting a rate increase. After two years of
investigation by a government task force and negotiations between
government agencies and AT&T, the claims of discrimination were
settled by a nationwide consent decree.
The parties to the consent decree predicted that under the terms of
the agreement approximately 13,000 women and 2,000 male minority
group employees would receive about $15,000,000 in restitution and
payments for equal-pay claims. Among other provisions, the AT&T
companies agreed to pay approximately 36,000 workers $23,000,000
per year in higher wages. The Chairman of the EEOC has called the
AT&T setlement "the most significant legal settlement in civil rights
employment history and one which certainly illustrates just how costly
employment discrimination can be to an employer."44
Comments on the AT&T case by the United States Commission on
Civil Rights, however, cast doubt on the adequacy of the settlement
from the standpoint of the female and minority workers affected. In
a statement published in the same month the AT&T settlement was
reached, and apparently written the previous summer, the Civil Rights
Commission said, "Based upon evidence adduced by EEOC, there is
over $3 billion in back pay involved. EEOC had thought in terms
of seeking only a small percentage of this figure ($50 to $75 million),
while FCC thought $300 million should be sought in a national agree-
ment."'45
The prospective relief provided by the EEOC-AT&T consent decree
was held insufficient less than two months after its entry in Leisner v.
42. 5 F.E.P. Cases 986, 989 (E.D. Va. 1973) (not yet decided on the merits).
43. F.E.P. 431:73; Civil No. 73-149 (E.D. Pa., complaint and consent decree
filed Jan. 18, 1973).
44. Statement by William H. Brown III, Chairman, EEOC, to the Joint
Economic Committee, July 11, 1973.
45. U.S. COMAI'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORE-
BENT EFFORT-A REASSESSMENT 89 n.18 (1973).
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New York Telephone Co.46 On a motion for preliminary injunction
by plaintiffs, a class of female workers who also were covered by the
nationwide consent decree, the federal district court held that the
relief provided by the nationwide consent decree was inadequate in
several respects to protect the members of the plaintiff class and
granted plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction against certain
specific discriminatory practices pending trial of the permanent in-
junction.47
The discrepancy between the figures in the Civil Rights Commis-
sion's statement and the provisions of the nationwide consent decree
demonstrates that it is practically impossible to evaluate the adequacy
of relief in a given case (or in an entire enforcement program) on
the basis of the facts generally available to nonparties. The result in
Leisner demonstrates that, though private plaintiffs may not be finan-
cially able to handle company cases successfully without government
participation, nevertheless, private parties, litigating as individuals
or as representatives of manageable classes, can help keep company
case settlements between government agencies and defendants up to
adequate levels.48
II. THE ENFORCEMENT RECORD AND FuTuRE PROSPEcTS
This section summarizes the enforcement activities of the Depart-
ment of Justice, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (the
leading private litigation firm in the Title VII field) since the adop-
tion of the Act.
A. Department of Justice
The Department of Justice filed a total of 100 "pattern or practice"
lawsuits between the effective date of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and
August 15, 1973. Of these, 26 were filed after the 1972 amendments
to the Act. The Department has resolved 57 of its cases, 37 by consent
decrees and 20 by favorable orders after trial.
46. 358 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
47. Id. at 370.
48. See Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973), where plaintiff workers were held entitled to
sue for remedies that had not been requested by the government in a plant-wide
suit against their employer.
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Since the 1972 amendments, covering state and local governments
and authorizing the Department of Justice to file suits to remedy dis-
crimination in police departments, fire departments, and other state
and local agencies, the Department has filed roughly half its new
cases against public employers, including police and fire departments
in Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Dallas and Los Angeles.
The following chart shows the number of pattern or practice cases
filed by the Attorney General against each category of defendants
since the passage of Title VII:
No. of
Principal Defendants Cases
Private Industry
Building construction trade unions 34
Trucking companies 13
Electric power companies 6
Railroads 4
Textile mills 3
Steel companies 3
Longshoremen's unions 2
Airlines 2
Miscellaneous 22
89
State and local government
Police and fire departments 7
State offices 1
8
Employment agencies 3
Total 100
B. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
After March of 1972 when the EEOC obtained authority to file
suits, its Office of General Counsel established a trial division in
Washington, D.C., and regional litigation centers in Philadelphia,
Atlanta, Chicago, Denver and San Francisco. By August 15, 1973, the
Commission's staff had filed a total of 132 lawsuits. None of the cases
had been tried on the merits.
During the summer of 1973 the Commission created a new unit
called the National Programs Division for the purpose of consolidat-
ing all of the Commission's investigations and conciliations against
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certain national employers, labor organizations, and trade associations.
On September 17, 1973, the Commission issued charges in proceedings
initiated by the National Programs Division against General Motors
Corporation, Ford Motor Company, General Electric Company, Sears,
Roebuck S, Company, and several unions.41 The creation of the Na-
tional Programs Division was an effort on the part of the Commission
to obtain adequate levels of compliance on the part of several re-
spondents through nationwide investigations and conciliations, re-
inforced by the threat of future litigation.
The following chart shows the number of cases against defendants
in the industries represented most often in EEOC's litigation to date:
No. of
Principal Defendants Cases
Electrical equipment manufacturers 8
Trucking companies 7
Paper mills 7
Building construction trade unions 6
Railroads 4
Automobile manufacturers 3
Banks 3
Hospitals 3
Miscellaneous 91
Total 132
C. Private Plaintiffs
Most lawsuits to remedy employment discrimination have been filed
by private plaintiffs. Between the passage of Title VII and November
1972, the single most active organization representing private plain-
tiffs-the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.-filed 155
employment discrimination cases.
The following chart shows the number of cases which the Fund
has filed against each type of defendant. There is no way to know
whether the Fund's litigation is representative of private litigation as
a whole because there is no procedure for counting or analyzing
pending private employment discrimination suits.
49. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 18, 1973, at 7, col. 2.
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No. of
Principal Defendants Cases
Paper mills 16
Trucking companies 13
Railroads 13
Steel companies 11
Chemical companies 10
Building construction trade unions 9
Police departments 8
Textile mills 7
Electric power companies 6
Tobacco processing companies 4
Airlines 3
Employment agencies 3
Others 52
Total 155
CONCLUSION
The suits filed by the Department of Justice vary widely in their
scope. The Attorney General has filed plant-wide cases against United
States Steel Corporation, o Alabama's largest employer, and Southern
Weaving Company,5' one of the smallest employers covered by the
Act. The suits filed by the EEOC also vary widely. At one end of the
scale is the nationwide case against AT&T.52 At the other end of the
scale is a case against Stan's Sandwich Shop in Atlanta.53
The extent to which litigation by the Department of Justice, the
EEOC, and private plaintiffs meets the needs of female and minority
workers for enforcement of the law against discrimination cannot
really be evaluated because too many essential facts are unknown,
such as the number of workers who have secured relief from discrim-
ination as a result of the litigation, or the value of the remedies
workers have obtained in comparison to the amount of their losses.
A comparison, however, between the total number of Title VII law-
suits filed by Justice, the EEOC, and the Legal Defense Fund in the
past eight years-387-and the more than 70,000 charges of discrimin-
50. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 5 F.E.P. Cases 1253 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
51. United States v. Southern Weaving Co., Civil No. 68-10 (E.D.S.C., filed
Jan. 12, 1968).
52. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
53. EEOC v. Stan's Sandwich Shop, Inc., Civil No. 18205 (N.D. Ga., filed
Apr. 23, 1973).
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ation now pending before the EEOC5 4 or the 559,000 private em-
ployers covered by the law, suggests a wide gap between the need
for enforcement action and the capacity of both government and pri-
vate sources to provide it. The comparison also suggests that many
more cases will be filed and litigated before the country achieves
widespread compliance with the law.
In any event, the history of Title VII, and the enforcement capa-
bilities and practices of the various organizations charged with its
implementation, make evident the fact that the individual or relatively
small employer will feel little compulsion to conform to the tenets
of the Act. To overcome the inertia of the status quo, the Justice
Department and the EEOC will have to step up their enforcement
activities and campaigns, make greater efforts to inform employers
of their potential liabilities if compliance is not met voluntarily, and
encourage the individual employee to take a greater initiative, either
privately or with others in his situation, in the protection of his rights
guaranteed by Title VII.
5L Statement by William H. Brown III, Chairman, EEOC, to the Joint
Economic Committee, July 11, 1973.
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